

FEDERAL SPENDING CATEGORIES—Continued  
(In billions of nominal dollars—Source: CBO)

Year	Outlays	Dollar growth	Percent growth	Percent of GDP
1983	56	6	13	2
1984	61	6	10	2
1985	70	9	14	2
1986	74	5	6	2
1987	80	6	8	2
1988	86	6	7	2
1989	94	9	10	2
1990	107	13	14	2
1991	114	7	6	2
1992	129	15	13	2
1993	143	14	11	2
1994	160	17	12	2
1995	176	16	10	2
1996	196	20	11	3
1997	217	21	11	3
1998	238	21	10	3
1999	262	24	10	3
2000	286	24	9	3

## AFDC

1980	7			0
1981	8		12	0
1982	8	(1)	-2	0
1983	8	0	5	0
1984	9	1	6	0
1985	9	0	3	0
1986	10	1	8	0
1987	11	1	6	0
1988	11	0	3	0
1989	11	0	4	0
1990	12	1	9	0
1991	14	1	11	0
1992	16	2	16	0
1993	16	0	3	0
1994	17	1	6	0
1995	18	1	6	0
1996	18	0	0	0
1997	19	1	6	0
1998	19	0	0	0
1999	20	1	5	0
2000	20	0	0	0

## Farm Price Supports

1980	3			0
1981	4	1	43	0
1982	12	8	193	0
1983	19	7	62	1
1984	7	(12)	-61	0
1985	18	10	142	0
1986	26	8	46	1
1987	22	(3)	-13	0
1988	12	(10)	-46	0
1989	11	(2)	-13	0
1990	7	(4)	-39	0
1991	10	4	55	0
1992	9	(1)	-8	0
1993	16	6	68	0
1994	10	(6)	-36	0
1995	10	0	0	0
1996	9	(1)	-10	0
1997	9	0	0	0
1998	8	(1)	-11	0
1999	8	0	0	0
2000	8	0	0	0

## Veterans Benefits &amp; Services

1980	14			1
1981	15	1	10	1
1982	16	0	3	1
1983	16	0	1	0
1984	16	0	1	0
1985	16	(0)	-1	0
1986	16	(0)	-1	0
1987	16	0	0	0
1988	18	2	12	0
1989	18	0	1	0
1990	16	(2)	-10	0
1991	17	1	9	0
1992	20	2	13	0
1993	21	1	7	0
1994	18	(3)	-14	0
1995	17	(1)	-6	0
1996	17	0	0	0
1997	18	1	6	0
1998	19	1	6	0
1999	20	1	5	0
2000	21	1	5	0

## Fed. Retirement and Disability

1980	32			1
1981	37	5	17	1
1982	41	3	9	1
1983	43	3	6	1
1984	45	2	3	1
1985	46	1	2	1
1986	48	2	4	1
1987	51	3	7	1
1988	54	3	7	1
1989	57	3	6	1
1990	60	3	5	1
1991	64	5	8	1
1992	67	2	3	1
1993	69	2	3	1
1994	72	3	5	1
1995	75	3	4	1
1996	77	2	3	1
1997	81	4	5	1
1998	85	4	5	1
1999	90	5	6	1

FEDERAL SPENDING CATEGORIES—Continued  
(In billions of nominal dollars—Source: CBO)

Year	Outlays	Dollar growth	Percent growth	Percent of GDP
2000	96	6	7	1
Other Mandatory				
1980	160			6
1981	187	27	17	6
1982	196	9	5	6
1983	208	13	6	6
1984	219	10	5	6
1985	241	22	10	6
1986	233	(8)	-3	5
1987	235	2	1	5
1988	255	20	8	5
1989	270	15	6	5
1990	288	18	7	5
1991	314	26	9	5
1992	336	23	7	6
1993	352	16	5	6
1994	368	16	4	6
1995	394	26	7	6
1996	412	18	5	6
1997	431	19	5	5
1998	454	23	5	5
1999	477	23	5	5
2000	507	30	6	6

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, these are just facts. These are not altered, these are not gamed in any way to try and make any particular point, except to show that spending has been exploding. We cannot continue to increase spending. That is why I believe we have to pass a constitutional amendment to balance the budget. I hope my colleagues will vote for it. I hope my colleagues will pass it. I know it is going to force us to make difficult decisions. And if we do not, Congress will unfortunately continue to find excuses not to make the tough decisions, and we will see the deficits continue to climb. I hope we will take the responsible action on Tuesday and pass a constitutional amendment to make us balance the budget.

I yield the floor, and I thank my friend from Arkansas.

### WAS CONGRESS IRRESPONSIBLE? THE VOTERS HAVE SAID YES

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as of the close of business on Thursday, February 23, the Federal debt stood at \$4,837,336,500,173.73 meaning that on a per capita basis, every man, woman, and child in America owes \$18,362.61 as his or her share of that debt.

### FINANCIAL AID TO MEXICO

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, when President Clinton announced a financial package to aid Mexico in its current economic crisis, Speaker GINGRICH and I announced our support. Mexico was, and is, of vital importance to the United States. In my view, we could not stand by and watch Mexico financially melt down if there were any realistic chance to help.

Earlier this week, an agreement was signed between the United States and Mexico, and its full details were released to the public. I have analyzed it, with the help of staff, outside advisers, and other Senators. I find it somewhat surprising and, at its core, disappointing. My message should not be misinterpreted—I do want United States efforts to assist Mexico to work.

I hope we can help Mexico achieve the financial stability that they so desperately need. However, I must reluctantly point out the shortcomings of the agreement reached this week.

In my view, the basic mistake Mexico made last year was allowing events to get to the point where the only apparent choice was to devalue the peso. Perhaps the Government believed that a little devaluation would be a good thing.

Common sense should have recognized that Mexico's decision to break its promise to the Mexican people to keep the peso stable against the dollar would precipitate a breach of trust—a stampede to get out of pesos and into dollars.

The Treasury Department needs to be very careful in the use of funds from the exchange stabilization fund. For example, I am not convinced that thrusting the United States into the middle of a Mexican banking crisis is prudent or necessary.

The primary focus of the stabilization plan is not aimed at reversing the fundamental mistake of devaluation—not now and not over time. The measures described in the agreement to firm up the price of the peso seem almost an afterthought. They do not address the problem of extinguishing the excess pesos that have been coming off the Mexican printing presses, even as recently as last week. The heart of the problem is restoring confidence in Mexican pledges by moving toward restoring the value of Mexico's currency, and I hope it is not too late. I hope that administration officials will still focus on the main target: extinguishing pesos and restoring confidence in the Mexican currency. This should be the first priority, not raising interest rates.

It appears my concerns are shared by the markets. When it was first announced that the United States would help Mexico, the Mexican stock market went up and the peso strengthened. Yet when the exact terms of the deal were made public, the peso weakened and the stock market resumed its slide.

In the coming days and weeks, Congress will examine many issues in the Mexico situation—what advice the administration gave, when officials knew about the devaluation, allegations of conflict of interest, and other issues. I am also working with the administration to send a group of Senators to Mexico in the near future to get a firsthand assessment of the situation. A central part of that assessment will be looking at whether the administration's proposed medicine will cure the disease.

### RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRATION'S OIL IMPORT STUDY

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern for a lack of response by President Clinton to a recent report by the Department of Commerce. This report indicates our